What?

Master Course Computational Logic‏

We are glad to announce to you the possibility to join our
European Master's Program of Computational Logic. This
program is offered jointly at the Free-University of Bozen-
Bolzano in Italy, the Technische Universität Dresden in Germany, the Universidade Nova de Lisboa in Portugal and the Technische Universität Wien inAustria.

Within this program you have the choice to study at two
/three of the four European universities. In addition you
can do your project work at the National ICT of Australia
(NICTA).

You will graduate with a MSc in Computer Science and obtain a double/multiple degree. Information on the universities and the program including the application form are provided here:

http://www.emcl-study.eu/home.html

Language of instruction is English. Tuition fees are 3.000
EUR (for non-European students) and 1.000 (for European
students) per year. In addition, we would like to draw your attention to the ERASMUS-MUNDUS scholarship program.The ERASMUS-MUNDUS consortium offers 2-year scholarships upto 48.000 EUR for non-EU students and upto 23.000 EUR for EU students of our European Master's Program in Computational Logic.

More information on the application procedure is available from:

http://www.emcl-study.eu/application.html

Prof. Dr. Steffen Hoelldobler
International Center for Computational Logic
Technische Universität Dresden
01062 Dresden, Germany
phone: [+49](351)46 33 83 40
fax: [+49](351)46 33 83 42

email: sh@iccl.tu-dresden.de

Ciao,

sono andato a leggere la pagina di Wikipedia dedicata al paradosso di Curry: http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradosso_di_Curry . Non ho tempo di imparare a modificare le voci di Wikipedia, ma questa ha bisogno di revisione. Questa frase è esilarante: "Per la legge dell’implicazione materiale, l’unica possibilità ammessa è che l’antecedente di questa [sic] condizionale (“Se A è vero”) assuma il valore di verità, mentre il conseguente (“Allora Babbo Natale esiste”) assuma quello di falsità [!!!]". Non male inventarsi i "valori di falsità".

Vi sono vari altri errori (come, per esempio, parlare di logica del primo ordine, quando è sufficiente la logica proposizionale) e alcune sezioni, in particolare l'ultima, sono inintelligibili.

Se qualcuno sapesse come intervenire e ne avesse tempo e voglia, farebbe una cosa buona.

Ciao,

Matteo

Workshop sulla conseguenza logica a Padova

Seminario di Logica e Filosofia Analitica - Universita' di Padova

Cogito/Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Logic (http://cogito.lagado.org/node/520)

Workshop: Nuove ricerche sulla conseguenza logica

(programma aggiornato)

Lunedi’ 29 Novembre 2010, Aula Seminari, ore 10-17.45

Dipartimento di Filosofia, Universita' di Padova

P.zza Capitaniato 3 - Padova

10 -11: Marcello D’Agostino (Ferrara), Conseguenza Logica e informazione

11-12: Pierdaniele Giaretta (Padova) Cosa segue da una convenzione?

12-12.15: Pausa caffé

12.15 - 13.15: Massimiliano Carrara e Enrico Martino (Padova),Conseguenza logica, dialeteismo e paradosso di Curry

14.30-15.30: Julien Murzi (Munich, D) Due aspetti del paradosso di Curry

15.30-16.30: Roberto Ciuni (Delft, NL), Asserzione e conseguenza logica nelle discussive logics e logiche affini.

16.30-16.45: Pausa caffé

16.45-17.45: Vittorio Morato (Padova), Attualità e validità

Per informazioni contattare:

Massimiliano Carrara: massimiliano.carrara@unipd.it

Chronos 10: 10th international conference on tense, aspect, modality and evidentiality

CHRONOS is a series of conferences devoted to current research on the morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of markers of tense, aspect, modality and evidentiality (TAME).

Jacob in Statale

Martedì 23 novembre, ore 16:30, Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Festa del Perdono 7 - Aula435

Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris) "Ascribing goals"

Abstract
This paper is devoted to the experimental investigation of the fundamental mechanisms enabling preverbal human infants to represent and reason about an agent’s action as goal-directed and to ascribe a goal to an agent. I examine the scope and limits of what I call the “shared intentionality” model of goal-ascription. According to two basic assumptions of this model, (i) the process of goal-ascription consists in sharing the agent’s goal and (ii) preverbal human infants share goals only with familiar (i.e. perceptually human-like) agents who perform familiar (i.e. executable) actions. This model derives much of its appeal to its ability to integrate behavioral developmental evidence together with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about mirror neuron (MN) activity based on single-cell recording in the brain of non-human primates. Furthermore, recent developmental behavioral evidence showing that human infants’ motor experience enhances their ability to represent others’ actions as goal-directed has been interpreted as evidence for the role of MN activity (or mirroring) in early goal-ascription by human infants. I offer a different interpretation

L'estate sta arrivando

Summer School in Logic, Language, and Information.
Slovenia, 1-12 Agosto 2011

Tutti gli studenti interessati al rapporto tra linguaggi formali e lingue naturali dovrebbero dare un occhio qui

Philosophy Podcast

Ciao,

qui si possono trovare interessanti registrazioni su argomenti filosofici:

http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/news_events/podcasts.html .

Ciao,

Matteo

Hughes a Genova

Università degli Studi di Genova
Dipartimento di Filosofia
9 e 10 novembre 2010

Christopher Hughes (King's College, London) -
"Verità e contingenza"

- Martedì 9 novembre, h. 15.00-17.00, Aula N, via Balbi 4
- Mercoledì 10 novembre, h. 10.00-12.00, Aula 5, via Balbi 2

Andy Clark a Milano

Lunedì 8 Novembre- h 14.30
Università degli Studi di Milano - Via Festa del Perdono 7 - aula 435

Andy Clark (Edimburgo)
Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science

Abstract
Brains, according to an increasingly influential research program in computational neuroscience, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells whose evolved role is to enable the right action to occur at the right time, and this is achieved by minimizing prediction error (thus minimizing informational surprise) within a hierarchy of cortical processing regions. This ‘hierarchical prediction machine’ approach yields a unifying model of perception and action, and may neatly capture the special contribution of neural processing to adaptive success. In this talk, I first lay out the key elements of this approach, while noting some potentially problematic elements along the way. Putting the problems aside, I then ask what such a model would imply for our general vision of brains, minds, and situated agents.